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Abstract 
Conventional accounts of the South China Sea territorial disputes identify China’s assertive 
behaviour as the primary cause of the rising tension since the early 2010s. This paper goes 
beyond this traditional view of the disputes by arguing that the territorial disputes are an 
expression of the broader contestation between two order-building projects by China and the 
US. China’s assertive behaviour originates in its desire to promote a ‘historical’ and ‘post-
colonial’ maritime order that is premised on its Sino-centric historical narrative of the Sea and 
on its emphasis on the historical legitimacy of the regional order of 1943-1945. The US-led 
‘liberal’ maritime order is underpinned by a post-war legal framework built on the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the 
notion and practice of freedom of navigation. Since October 2015 the US has enhanced its 
Freedom of Navigation Operations to challenge China’s ‘excessive’ maritime or territorial 
claims. We conclude that as a result of the uneasy co-existence of these two order-building 
projects, which fundamentally disagree over the foundations of maritime order in the South 
China Sea, the disputes have reached an open-ended impasse. 
 
Keywords: South China Sea, international order, San Francisco Peace Treaty, UNCLOS, 
freedom of navigation 
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Introduction  
English-language literature on the territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea is 
extensive, but much of the recent debate focuses on China’s allegedly assertive behaviour and 
its ‘salami-slicing’ strategy to change the status quo incrementally in China’s favour (Johnston 
2013, O'Rourke 2017, 25, Swaine and Fravel 2011, Thayer 2011, Yahuda 2013, Zhou 2016).1 
These authors interpret Beijing’s shift towards assertiveness in the South China Sea as a 
reaction to the Obama administration’s decision to rebalance to Asia. From this perspective, 
the reversal of China’s long-standing policy of moderation, which prioritised maintaining 
regional peace and stability, was brought about by US intentions to regionalise the South China 
Sea disputes, and by Washington’s push for their management, if not resolution, through the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). To safeguard its legitimate sovereign rights, 
the argument continues, China was forced to act to establish credible deterrence to forestall 
further ‘provocative’ behaviour of other claimant states. The surge of (maritime) nationalism 
and the growth of Chinese naval capacity also contribute to the increasingly assertive approach. 
 
In contrast, the Chinese government argues in their policy papers and mass media outlets that 
it simply defends its sovereign rights to the South China Sea. From this perspective, China 
views its behaviour as defensive, not aggressive or expansive. In its May 2009 note verbale to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Beijing declared, ‘China has indisputable 
sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters …’ (Permanent 
Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN 2009).  The Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has argued that ‘the essence of the South China Sea issue is the territorial sovereignty 
dispute caused by others’ invasion of some islands of China’s Nansha [Spratly] Islands …. 
[consequently,] China has the right to defend its territorial and maritime rights and interests as 
other countries do’ (emphasis added) (Gao and Jia 2013, 120). 
 
These contrasting understandings about sovereignty over, or occupation of, the disputed 
territories in the South China Sea are treated by many scholars and policy-makers as the 
primary source of the rising tension. These accounts on their own, however, cannot explain the 
                                                          
1 Another line of inquiry is pursued by Bill Hayton (Hayton 2018) who investigates the historical and social 
construction of China’s maritime geo-body and its changing boundaries, based on an imagined emotional 
discourse about space (see also: Hayton (2017)). Hayton, in turns, draw on Callahan and Winichakul (Callahan 
2009, Winichakul 1994). 
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deeper connection between the maritime disputes and geopolitics. Specifically, what drives 
China’s dogged determination to pursue an assertive strategy to protect its rights? One may ask 
why China believes that it is legitimate to claim its self-proclaimed rights to the largely 
uninhabited archipelagos, even in the face of mounting resistance from stake-holding states. 
Similarly, what underpins US modifications in its traditional policy of neutrality by declaring 
the South China Sea a matter of US national interest in 2010 (Clinton 2010)?  One may consider 
why the US similarly believes that it is legitimate to contest China’s claims, even though it 
simultaneously pledges that it takes no position on the sovereignty disputes (Dolven, Manyin 
and Kan 2014, 1).  
 
We offer a fresh perspective by examining the foundations of the disputes rather than the 
superficial details of the disputes themselves, and conclude that the disputes are evidence of 
growing contestation between two order-building projects by China and the US in the South 
China Sea. The deeper foundations are manifest by the direct attempts each makes to 
delegitimise the other’s claims and actions as a means to safeguard their own preferred regional 
maritime order. This paper uses an under-researched ‘international order’ perspective to 
explore the contestation between the Chinese ‘historical’ and ‘post-colonial’ order2 and the 
American-led post-war ‘liberal’ order.3  We investigate both the action and socially produced 
representations of ‘reality’ employed by China and the US in their respective regional maritime 
order-building projects.  
 
The Chinese narrative, or socially constructed memories of past events (Lamont 2015, 43), 
attaches significance to history, international order and their collective impact on the territorial 
disputes. To defend and safeguard its sovereign rights to the South China Sea, China is 
attempting to fashion a contemporary maritime order that harks back to the ‘legitimate’ 
regional maritime order of 1943-1945.4 Dai Bingguo, former Chinese senior diplomat and State 
Councillor (2008-2013), expressed clearly that ‘the return of Nansha [Spratly] Islands to China 
is part of the post-war international order and relevant territorial arrangements’ (emphasis 
                                                          
2 It is a historical order because it is based on the alleged historical governance by imperial Chinese governments 
and a post-colonial order because of China’s allegation that freedom of navigation by warships was a Western 
colonial practice (Zhang 2010, 37). 
3 Morton (2016) also views the South China Sea dispute from the perspective of maritime order. While protection 
of the global commons, including freedom of the seas, forms a strand of the ‘liberal international order’, as noted 
by Nye (2019, 71-72), the liberal elements of the American order are often exaggerated. The Truman Proclamation 
on the Continental Shelf of 1945, which unilaterally extended US jurisdiction over the natural resources towards 
the high seas, is a case in point (Tanaka 2015, 137).  
4 The order was built on the Cairo Declaration of November 1943 and the Po sdam Declaration of July 1945. 
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added) (Dai 2016). To justify its preferred order and to delegitimise the US-led order, Beijing 
expends much effort in eroding the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a chief 
pillar of the rules-based maritime order, through its contestation of the regulatory rules of 
warship navigation in the Sea. The US, in contrast, defends a rules-based regional maritime 
order underpinned by the Treaty of San Francisco (1951) – to which China was not a signatory 
– and contemporary international maritime law, especially UNCLOS (yet to be ratified by the 
US Senate),5 and reinforced through its system of regional bilateral security alliances and 
partnerships. The American-led regional maritime order emphasises customary international 
maritime practices, such as freedom of navigation (FON) and the rule of law. By framing 
China’s activities as contravention of international law (UNCLOS), and by corralling support 
from allies and friends across the Indo-Pacific region in support of its freedom of navigation 
operations (FONOPs), Washington seeks to delegitimise the foundations of Beijing’s preferred 
order in the South China Sea.  
 
This paper proceeds in four steps. First, it introduces an international order approach to the 
study of the South China Sea territorial disputes. It is followed in Sections 2 and 3 respectively 
by discussions of China’s and the US’s competing conceptions of the South China Sea 
maritime order. At the centre of Section 4 is how China, as a re-emerging power in the Asia-
Pacific, attempts to unsettle the post-1951 American-led order; it focuses on the divergent 
interpretations of some key norms and articles of UNCLOS with regard to FON, and the 
increasing use of FONOPs by the US to counter China. It concludes that the disputes remain 
deadlocked because of the uneasy co-existence of these two order-building projects. 
 
 
Creating, contesting and recreating order 
International politics can be understood as ‘a succession of ordered systems created by leading 
– or hegemonic – states that emerge after war with the opportunities and capabilities to organize 
the rules and arrangements of interstate relations’ (emphasis added) (Ikenberry 2014, 3-4). A 
central question in the study of international relations concerns how order in a world of 
sovereign states is created, maintained, contested, broken down and recreated (Ikenberry 2001, 
                                                          
5 Both the US government and Senate do not hold any principled opposition to UNCLOS. The disagreement 
centres on the implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS concerning deep seabed mining and the associated principle 
of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ and the developing world’s call for a New International Economic Order 
(Malone 1983). The American government adheres to the rest of UNCLOS as part of customary international law. 
Malone was the chairman of US delegation to UNCLOS III. 
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3, 22-23). This section elucidates the concept of international order and discusses the relevance 
of order contestation to the evolution of Chinese polity as well as the international law of the 
sea. 
 
Bull (2002) studied international order and society from both analytical and historical angles, 
with the latter emphasising the importance of historically-constructed understandings of 
international society. As Hurrell points out, ‘All human societies rely on historical stories about 
themselves to legitimise notions of where they are and where they might be going’ (2002, x-
xi, xiii). 6 A weakness of Bull’s analytical approach is that he was concerned more about how 
international order can be maintained within the society of states,7  rather than about 
contestation between different order-building projects. This paper seeks to fill this gap by using 
an international order approach to discuss how Chinese and American competing order projects 
have unsettling effects on one another. In so doing, we consider how the Chinese and US 
maritime orders in the South China Sea have emerged in conception and practice, how each 
justifies the extension of the norms and rules they espouse and how they have constructed 
historical stories to legitimise their respective preferred maritime order. 
 
The working definition of an international order in this paper is ‘a political formation in which 
settled rules and arrangements exist between states to guide their interaction’ (emphasis added) 
(Ikenberry 2011, 36). Crucial to the formation of an international order is not the fact that it is 
often created by leading state(s) – hence a hierarchy – but also the dominant norms and rules 
of that order must be broadly mutually acceptable to both the leading and secondary states (see 
also Lebow (2018, 8)). The norms and rules are designed not only to preserve the unrivalled 
interests of the leaders but also to facilitate cooperation between states within the order, as well 
as stability, durability and predictability in their interactions (Ikenberry 2001, 3-20, 22-23). 
This is echoed by Acharya, who argues that global order is founded on a set of ideas that ‘help 
to limit conflict, induce cooperation and stability, and expand legitimacy through 
representation and participation’ (Acharya 2018a, 11). However, because of power 
asymmetries between leading and secondary states, these primary goals, albeit beneficial to all 
parties, are not decided upon naturally in practice. The leading state not only determines the 
course of interaction, it also regulates the rules of the game in its favour. Broadly speaking, in 
                                                          
6 Quotation on p. xiii. Emphasis added. 
7 See chapters 3, 5-9. 
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an order characterised by the liberal tradition, the leading state sets up and exercises power 
through negotiated rules and institutions, which prevent it from exerting power arbitrarily. It 
both provides other states with public goods such as security, freedom (of navigation) and an 
open trade and financial regime in exchange for their participation and cooperation, and gives 
secondary states ‘voice opportunities’ in the collective policy-making process (Ikenberry 2011, 
73-75). 
 
The process of US order-building after 1945 was characterised by the establishment of binding 
rules-based institutions. In the Asia-Pacific, the US-led order was predicated on the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) (1951) with Japan –  treaty whose reach was not limited to 
Japan but covered the territories in the Asia-Pacific formerly occupied by Japan during the war 
(Hara 1999, 517-518).  This Treaty, along with hub-and-spokes security arrangements, 
established the regional political structure and reflected the strategic interests of the US, as the 
principal drafter of the Treaty (Hara 1999, 517-518). Several regional states were drawn into 
the US Cold War security umbrella through bilateral alliances and with American assurances 
they would not be dominated or abandoned: with Taiwan (up to 1979), South Korea and Japan 
(in Northeast Asia), the Philippines and Thailand (in Southeast Asia), and with Australia and 
New Zealand (ANZUS) (in Oceania) (Miller and Wich 2011, 106-109). Due to the political 
complexities of the region as a frontier against communist expansion in the early post-war 
years, and unlike the order that was fostered in Europe after 1945, less emphasis was placed 
on nurturing East Asian regional multilateralism. Consequently, weaker regional organisations 
such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1954-77, and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), from 1967 onwards, were established. In short, the post-
war American-led order, incorporating Northeast and Southeast Asia, was hierarchical, centred 
on anti-communist security alliances and supported by weak multilateral institutions (Ikenberry 
2011, 297, Katzenstein 2005, 44-50).  
 
More concerned with the pressing need to stabilise regional security and limit the spread of 
communism, the SFPT sowed the seeds for many of the unresolved territorial disputes in the 
region with direct consequences for the regional maritime orders in the East and South China 
Seas. The Treaty was neither specific in naming the recipients of islands renounced by Japan, 
nor did it define the maritime delimitation of the islands. Rather than viewing the control of 
the islands as of secondary importance, Hara asserts, Washington deliberately left the territorial 
issues unresolved as part of its Cold War China containment strategy (Hara 2012). Not only 
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were those directly concerned with the territories not party to the Treaty,8 bu  the problems 
created multilaterally by third parties in 1951 have been passed down onto subsequent 
generations in the form of unresolved territorial disputes, which have come to dominate the 
regional maritime sphere (Hara 2012). 
 
The re-emergence of powerful non-Western states in the past two decades, most notably China, 
has produced assertions that the American ordering may not be normatively acceptable. 
Aspiring non-Western powers may therefore want to undertake order-building to promote new 
norms in a global order as a means to improve their social standing and rankings in international 
normative hierarchy.9 All powers, especially the dominant hegemon, are tempted to build an 
order that accords closely with their own interests, which can also be viewed as an investment 
or insurance against future contingencies (Ikenberry 2001, 55, Ikenberry 2011, 108). Even as 
its material power declines, ‘[i]nstitutions can both conserve and prolong the power advantage 
of the leading state’, thereby safeguarding its interests, preferences and international status 
(Ikenberry 2011, 108). Contestation over order-building is per se a battle for legitimacy as well 
as interests for both the rising and incumbent powers.   
 
Order contestation is not new to China. It faced a similar acrimonious confrontation when 
European International Society, aided by imperialism and ‘gunboat diplomacy’, expanded into 
East Asia in the nineteenth century. In its expansion, according to a refined and nuanced 
English School account, European International Society demanded homogeneity whereby an 
‘uncivilised’ non-European state had to comply with the European ‘standard of civilisation’ in 
order to be admitted to the Society. However, China’s state response was to reject that demand 
for homogeneity while seeking military modernisation (Gong 1984, Suzuki 2009). As will be 
discussed in more detail below, the American-led post-war liberal order with regard to the 
South China Sea has also sought homogeneity by imposing so-called ‘universal’ maritime 
norms and rules on non-Western China, and China’s response is the same: to reject that top-
down demand by advancing its own ordering project. Indeed, China took issue with the 
Eurocentric composition of the South China Sea Arbitration Tribunal, constituted under Annex 
                                                          
8 Due to disagreement among the allies over which Chinese government had offici l recognition – the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) or the Republic of China on Taiwan, neither was invited. In addition, neither North nor 
South Korea was present. The implications for the post-war order of their non-participation is explored in more 
detail in the next section. 
9 Towns argues that social hierarchy is a core feature of international society, which itself is ‘a stratifying society 
in which states are socially ranked and ordered’ and that norms generate social hierarchy and ranking (Towns 
2010, 41, Towns 2012). 
8 | P a g e 
 
VII to UNCLOS, questioning whether the appointed judges, all from or living in Europe, 
acquainted themselves enough with Asian culture and the South China Sea dispute (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, PRC 2016). China’s contemporary project is to unsettle the American order 
and replace it with a modern version of the Sino-centric East Asian International Society prior 
to its encounter with Europeans.  
 
It is equally fruitful to apply an international order contestation approach to the study of 
maritime territorial disputes. The international law of the sea historically originated in more 
than a single source and was never an exclusive product of European powers. Non-Western 
states had a significant role to play in its historical evolution. A major source, according to 
Anand (1982), was the Indo-Asian seafaring practices and norms up to the end of the fifteenth 
century when the Portuguese, the Spaniards and the Dutch competed for the spice trade in Asia. 
In the early seventeenth century, Grotius drew on the Indo-Asian maritime traditions to develop 
his doctrine of mare liberum (free sea).  He was countered by, among others, the Englishman 
John Selden who advocated mare clausum (closed sea) (Tanaka 2015, 17). Contemporary law 
of the seas is largely shaped by the competing ordering principles of mare liberum and mare 
clausum.  
 
Booth (1985) argues that in its attempts to bring order to seafaring, UNCLOS is a compromise 
between the naval powers and the coastal/littoral states. While it preserves the vested interests 
of naval powers, UNCLOS retains this tension between mare liberum held by prominent naval 
powers, and the US in particular, and mare clausum favoured by littoral states (this principled 
conflict is also explored by Anand (1982) and Sanger (1987)). In Booth’s words, ‘[h]istorically 
ocean regime development has swung between pressure for enclosure of parts of the sea on the 
one hand, and the desire for freedom of navigation on the other’ (Booth 1985, 14). Mare 
clausum is primarily manifest in the ‘territorialisation’ provisions for the 12-nautical mile (nm) 
territorial sea, the 200-nm exclusive economic zone, and the deep seabed mining regime. These 
competing doctrines lead to contestation over the norm of freedom of navigation between the 
naval powers of the North and the littoral states of the South, in particular China, Brazil and 
India, which wish to restrict foreign military activities near their coastal waters (Morton 2016, 
926). The rise of these powers may force a repositioning within the hierarchy, or ultimately 
lead to the transformation of order as a means to obtain those privileges currently enjoyed by 
the US or the West more broadly (Stuenkel 2016, 11).   
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Since international order is always in a process of becoming through contestation, the question 
is whether the American-led order can be transformed into an order with more representation 
and participation that can better integrate rising powers. The offensive realist, John 
Mearsheimer, refutes this possibility. In his words, ‘the United States … played a key role in 
preventing imperial Japan, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union from 
gaining regional supremacy’ (Mearsheimer 2014, 41). Other academics from constructivist 
approaches offer a less binary vision for order transformation. Kupchan asserts that the coming 
transition is likely to lead to ‘multiple versions of modernity’ (Kupchan 2012, 5). Similarly, 
both Acharya and Flockhart outline an international system consisting of several different 
orders, with the liberal order being only one of them (Acharya 2018b, Flockhart 2016). The 
coming transformation proposes a potentially politically diverse landscape, in which ‘the 
western model will offer only one of many competing conceptions of domestic and 
international order’ (Kupchan 2012, 5).  
 
If multiple versions of order are going to exist simultaneously, how is China’s contestation of 
the US-led rules-based order likely to manifest? Since contestation tends to occur over 
supposedly settled rules and arrangements, attention now turns to how China contests the 
settled rules and arrangements. China maintains that the initially sett ed regional maritime 
order, based on international agreements made between 1943 and 1945, was ‘illegitimately’ 
unsettled by the post-war order based on the SFPT, which was underpinned by the US’s anti-
Communist strategy. China’s re-emergence as a regional power has not only re-ignited China’s 
contestation over the US-dominated order as a means to overcome the political trauma in the 
national psyche caused by foreign invasion but also its will to assert its own conception of 
regional order as a means to restore its historical regional leadership position. As it restores its 




Humiliated China: The imperative of restoring the unsettled Sino-centric South China 
Sea order 
The maritime domain of the South China Sea is an issue-area in which China contests the US 
rules-based order, supported by Sino-centric historical storytelling, the downplaying of 
contemporary international law of the seas, and increasingly backed up by military means to 
strengthen its presence in the four major groups of islands or archipelagos in the Sea.  
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China claims that the Paracel (Xisha) Islands in the west, Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough 
Shoal (Zhongsha) in the middle, the Pratas (Dongsha) Islands in the east, and the Spratly 
(Nansha) Islands in the south were historically Chinese territories since they were first 
discovered by Chinese in the Han dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD) (Gao and Jia 2013, 99). China 
exercised sovereign jurisdiction over them from the Ming dynasty (1368 – 1644) until they 
were invaded and occupied by French and Japanese forces from 1930 up to the end of World 
War II in 1945 (Fu and Wu n.d., 4-5n).10  In accordance with the Cairo and Potsdam 
Declarations, the Republic of China (ROC) recovered the islands from the Japanese imperial 
government in December 1946, establishing sovereign control over major island groups in the 
South China Sea and stationing troops on Woody Island and Itu Aba Island (Taiping Island) in 
the Paracels (Fu and Wu n.d., 6, Hong 2012, 10). In 1947 the ROC government published an 
11-dash-line map, demarcating its ‘ownership’ of approximately 90 per cent of the South China 
Sea. Following the Chinese civil war, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claimed inherited 
territorial rights to the South China Sea from the ROC in 1949.  
 
As previously discussed, with the onset of the Cold War in East Asia and in the midst of the 
Korean War, sovereign control over the islands wa not explicitly returned to China under the 
SFPT due to their strategic significance in the Cold War context. Neither the ROC government 
(in Taipei) nor the PRC government (in Beijing) were invited to the San Francisco Peace 
Conference due to a disagreement between the organisers over which government officially 
represented China (Matsumura 2013). Ultimately, neither government was present nor party to 
the resultant Treaty. France and the State of Vietnam under Bo Dai pressed their claims to the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands at the Conference and the issue was left unsettled (Hong 2012, 12). 
Accordingly, Article 2(f) of the Treaty only declared that ‘Japan renounces all right, title and 
claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands’ without specifying to whom they would 
be returned (Taiwan Documents Project 1951). The consultations that followed in Washington, 
Manila and Taipei showed American primary concerns over Communist Chinese control over 
the islands, although the US recognised ‘Chinese’ sovereignty over them (Fu and Wu n.d., 13-
                                                          
10 Hayton challenges the authenticity of this Chinese historical narrative (Hayton 2014, Hayton 2017). Fu and Wu 
is an internal publication without the name of publisher and year of publication. However, the two authors are 
authoritative in the subject matter. Fu Ying is now serving in the Foreign Affairs Committee of China’s legislature, 
the National People’s Congress, and was formerly China’s ambassador to the Philippines, Australia and the UK 
and a Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Wu Shicun is the President of the National Institute of South China Sea 
Studies, http://en.nanhai.org.cn/index/survey/motto.html (accessed 4th September 2018). 
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16). This is echoed by Hara (2012) who argues that the SFPT made sure that the Paracels and 
Spratlys, which lie along the ‘Acheson Line’, the US Cold War line of defence in the Western 
Pacific, would not fall into the hands of Chinese Communists. 
 
What China had considered settled arrangements for the post-war order in the South China Sea 
quickly became unsettled. The failure to name China as the recipient state provided the 
Philippines and South Vietnam with the grounds for occupying the islands in the years 
following the SFPT. The PRC found it difficult to convince other littoral states of the 
legitimacy of its version of maritime order. The Philippines interpreted Japan’s renunciation 
without assigning any recipient as equivalent to a transformation of the status of the islands 
into res nullius (literally meaning ‘nobody’s property’), open to acquisition by other states 
(Aguda and Arellano-Aguda 2009, 583). Beijing initially believed the North Vietnamese 
Communists were an ally when Pham Van Dong, North Vietnam’s prime minister, promised 
to ‘fully respect’ Chinese sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in September 1958 
in response to the PRC declaration on its territorial waters unveiled in the same month (Fu and 
Wu n.d., 17, Hayton 2014, 96).11 ‘Inheriting’ the French claim to the islands, South Vietnam 
attempted to expel the PRC from the Paracels but the PRC retained control of them following 
a short battle in January 1974 (Gao and Jia 2013, 105). Following unification in 1975, the 
communist regime of Vietnam changed its policy stance and publicly announced its claim to 
the Paracels. Malaysia followed suit by announcing its own continental shelf, covering some 
of the Spratly islands and their adjacent waters, in 1979, thereby shifting the territorial disputes 
into the wider maritime arena (Fu and Wu n.d., 19). 
 
Another severe blow to the legitimisation of the Chinese preferred regional order was the 
adoption of UNCLOS in December 1982, even though the PRC was party to UNCLOS III 
negotiations. UNCLOS does not define or recognise the concepts of ‘historic waters’, ‘historic 
sovereignty/ownership’ and ‘historic rights/title’.12 By ratifying UNCLOS in 1996, according 
to a non-Chinese interpretation, China had “signed away its rights to claim ‘historical rights’ 
in other countries’ [exclusive economic zones]” (Hayton 2014, 117). However, China has 
                                                          
11 Fu and Wu admit that as a token of friendship to the North Vietnamese regime, China removed two dashes in 
the Gulf of Tonkin from the initial 11-dash line in 1953 (Fu and Wu n.d., 20). For a similar argument, see Gao 
and Jia (2013, 103, n37) . 
12 Historic rights may be defined as ‘rights over certain land or maritime areas acquired by a State through a 
continuous and public usage from time immemorial and acquiescence by other States, although those rights would 
not normally accrue to it under general international law’ (Tanaka 2015, 223). For the Chinese perspective on 
historic rights, see Li & Li (2003) and Zou (2001). 
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repeatedly argued that it possesses historic rights which were derived from ‘the practice of the 
Chinese people and the Chinese government throughout the long course of history’ (The 
Government of the People's Republic of China 2016, para. 3). The historic rights were 
established prior to the entry into force of UNCLOS by the fact that China was the first country 
that discovered, named, explored and exploited the resources (The Government of the People's 
Republic of China 2014, para. 4). Historic rights are enshrined in Chinese domestic law. Article 
14 of the 1998 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the EEZ and Continental Shelf 
reaffirms that while certain (restricted) freedoms are permissible in China’s EEZ, ‘[t]he 
provisions in this Law shall not affect the rights that the People’s Republic of China has been 
enjoying ever since the days of the past.’13  
 
UNCLOS instead codifies the 200nm EEZ and redefines the continental shelf, which facilitated 
moves by some littoral states (namely the Philippines, Vietnam and to a lesser degree, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei) to assert territorial jurisdiction over some of the islands and 
waters in the Sea, giving rise to overlapping claims. Through UNCLOS, Southeast Asian 
claimant states were formally able to challenge Chinese claims to the islands in the South China 
Sea, and, from China’s perspective, to ‘further consolidate their illegitimate encroachment’ 
under the framework of international maritime law (Fu and Wu n.d., 63). UNCLOS has 
effectively provided Malaysia and Vietnam with the legal mechanism to jointly submit their 
claims to the continental shelf beyond 200nm from their coastal lines to the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf in May 2009, without needing to stipulate ownership of the 
disputed islands (Hayton 2014, 119). In addition, as discussed above, the old tension between 
mare liberum and mare clausum remains unresolved. China’s narrow interpretation of 
UNCLOS’s Article 58 asserts that the right of freedom of navigation is not unrestricted and 
that it has the right to regulate the operations of foreign military vessels in its EEZs. According 
to China, what is not clearly authorised in UNCLOS is not permitted (Ji 2009). By using a mix 
of domestic legislation, Chinese-specific interpretations of UNCLOS and claims derived from 
its historic rights, China has engaged in ‘legal layering’ using three intersecting and 
contradictory sources of legitimacy (Kraska 2011, 315). 
 
                                                          
13  The 1998 Law is available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383573.htm 
(accessed 27 February 2019). 
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Making matters worse for China, direct American involvement in the South China Sea 
territorial disputes intensified during the Obama Administration. In May 2010, at a Sino-US 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) meeting in Washington, Dai Bingguo allegedly told 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton privately that the South China Sea constituted China’s ‘core 
interest’ (Swaine 2011, 8-9, Fu and Wu n.d., 72-73).14 In the Ministerial Meeting of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in the following July, Clinton openly expressed that 
‘the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s 
maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea,’ and that 
‘claimants should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to maritime space in 
accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (Clinton 2010). Clinton’s official 
statement introduced new elements to US policy that to Beijing only emphasised the dissipation 
of US neutrality over the disputed territories. Clinton’s suggestion that the US ‘would be 
prepared to facilitate initiatives and confidence-building measures’ implied to Beijing that the 
US was prepared to be party to the disputes (Clinton 2010). 
 
By internationalising the disputes as a matter for international law, the US was officially 
declaring that it did not recognise China’s claims to the disputed territories and openly rejected 
China’s conception of order. With its preferences delegitimised at the ARF meeting (twelve of 
the 27 countries present favoured the American approach), followed by a stand-off between 
Chinese fishing vessels and the Philippine navy in Scarborough Shoal in April 2012, Beijing 
resorted to coercive measures to reassert its claims. Since September 2013, China has 
intensified land reclamation activities around the Spratly Islands, increasing its de facto control 
over the disputed islands (Dolven, Elsea, et al. 2015, 1).15 These were supposed to enhance 
China’s bargaining power while agreeing to resume code of conduct negotiations with ASEAN 
in the same month (Fu and Wu n.d., 103-107, 114-115).   
 
Therefore, the current impasse primarily relates to China’s vision of a regional order based on 
the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations at the end of World War II as the basis for its sovereignty 
claims to the islands in the South China Sea and its contestation over the enforced regional 
order derived from the post-war SFPT. China holds that American anti-communist ideological 
concerns over China’s rise have encouraged encroachment on Chinese sovereignty over the 
                                                          
14 Fu and Wu contend, however, that there was no official record of this statement. 
15 The Chinese government did not acknowledge the reclamation until June 2015 (Dolven, Elsea, et al. 2015, 1). 
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South China Sea. In maintaining the story of its claims based on its sovereignty over the islands 
and the unspecified historic rights to the maritime areas within the ‘nin -dash line’, China’s 
primary goal is to delegitimise the claims made by the Philippines, which are derived from the 
SFPT, and Vietnam.16     
 
The second point of contestation concerns China’s challenge to post-war international law from 
which the US draws legitimacy for its maritime order in the South China Sea. Post-war 
international agreements with relevance to the South China Sea undermine Chinese territorial 
interests. UNCLOS, in particular, does not recognise China’s historic rights to the waters in 
the South China Sea that, according to China, preceded the advent of UNCLOS by ages (Gao 
and Jia 2013, 121, 123). Moreover, China rejects an exclusive reliance on UNCLOS to resolve 
the disputes, as UNCLOS does not rule on territorial sovereignty over insular features, which 
are at the heart of the South China Sea disputes. Both custom and history matter (Gao and Jia 
2013, 119).  
 
Beijing views UNCLOS as only the ‘first step towards the establishment of a new international 
legal order for the oceans’ (emphasis added) (Gao 2009, 294-295), and wants to play a greater 
role in the development of international maritime norms once it ratified UNCLOS in 1996. 
While acknowledging that historic rights may not conform to the prevailing international rules, 
some Chinese scholars have advanced an argument that China’s state practice regarding 
historic rights may influence the development of that concept in international law by using a 
principle enshrined in the preamble of UNCLOS, viz. ‘matters not regulated by this Convention 
continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law’ (Li and Li 
2003, Zou 2001). They argue that historic rights are ‘contained in customary international law 
outside the ambit of, and unaffected by, UNCLOS (Symmons 2016, 261-262). In implementing 
and enforcing its domestic legal framework for managing its own maritime zones, China is 
testing international regulation on the EEZ and actively pushing the boundaries and meaning 
of UNCLOS. Furthermore, Beijing’s response to the July 2016 ruling by the South China Sea 
Tribunal as ‘just a piece of waste paper’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC 2016) and its 
continued use of force to overturn the legal rights of its neighbours is a concerted effort to 
                                                          
16 The SFPT was designed to manage later claims of non-contracting parties. Article 25 states that the Treaty 
‘shall not confer any rights, titles, or benefits on any state which is not an Allied Power.’ Further, rights, titles and 
benefits can only be bestowed upon states which had signed and ratified the treaty (emphasis added) (Lee and 
Van Dyke 2010, 759).   
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reinterpret or renegotiate UNCLOS. A change to the current understanding of FON in the EEZ 
in China’s favour and the addition of Chinese self-proclaimed practice to the current 
international law of the sea would fundamentally alter the settled rules of navigation in 
international waters. 
 
To conclude, China’s order-building project entails a restoration of the 1943-45 order that 
recognised Chinese sovereignty over the islands, nullifying the void left by the SFPT, 
supplementing UNCLOS with Chinese historical practice with regard to historic rights in the 
South China Sea, and reinterpreting UNCLOS in favour of mare clausum. This irredentist and 
expansionist project inevitably sets China on a collision course with the US’s preferred rules-
based ordering project, based primarily on international treaty and law. In the following 
sections we consider how the US seeks legitimacy for its order by presenting itself as the 
upholder of international maritime law, while delegitimising China as a threat to the rules-
based order. The practice of freedom of navigation has come to represent the source of 
contestation between the two order-building projects and has taken centre stage in the regional 
strategies of both the Obama and Trump administrations. 
 
 
American universalism: The US preference for a rules-based South China Sea order 
As highlighted by the conceptual discussion of international order above, order-building 
projects reflect the values and interests of the main power. The character of the post-1945 
regional security order has been principally shaped by American leadership, using a mix of 
‘persuasion, incentives and coercion’ (Patrick 2016, 8). The American regional rules-based 
maritime order has come to be settled on the US hub-and-spokes alliance system and 
partnerships with regional states, supported by the guiding principles of international maritime 
law, including, but not limited to, territorial sovereignty, freedom from intervention and 
freedom of navigation in international waters, all underpinned by US naval power and 
operational bases across the Pacific. ‘Defending, deepening and extending’ this order has been 
the mainstay of  US foreign policy (Nye 2017, 12).  
 
The rules-based maritime order in the South China Sea is not only crucial for US naval access 
to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, but also enables the US to fulfil its role as the regional 
security provider, to provide free and open access to the global commons (O'Rourke 2018, 3-
4). There are several reasons why protecting the tenets of this order, and the status quo, is 
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fundamental to Washington. First, is the US Navy’s requirement to maintain free and open 
access to the world’s oceans, one of the global commons. A Department of Defense report 
published in August 2015 noted that EEZs covered by the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) 
– renamed the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOCOM) in May 2018 – presented 38% of 
the world’s oceans. Unchallenged excessive maritime claims would impede US naval activity 
in over one-third of the world’s oceans and restrict the freedom of the seas (US Department of 
Defense 2015, 23-24). Second, protecting the international rules-based maritime order is 
fundamental to maintaining America’s preeminent status within the hierarchical regional order. 
Any significant changes to the existing maritime order in the South China Sea by a challenger 
to that order is likely to encourage other challenger states to push for changes in other maritime 
spaces, which would potentially undermine the US-led order and the US leading position 
within it. Consequently, the American goal in the South China Sea is to deter, or at a minimum, 
to delay, the advance of a new regional order shaped by China’s values and interests.  
 
Defending this South China Sea order is complicated by several factors rooted in the process 
of US post-war order-building. First, the maritime order continues to be defined by 
Washington’s Cold War anti-communist strategy which enabled the equivocal wording of the 
post-war SFPT with regard to the ownership and delimitation of islands, including those of the 
South China Sea. Second, UNCLOS, principally the rules governing EEZs and the continental 
shelf, exacerbated the territorial problems, since ownership of the disputed territories could 
determine who would manage lucrative EEZs. Finally, the interests and military priorities of 
the naval powers took precedence over the concerns of those coastal states who wanted to 
regulate military freedom of navigation and overflight in their EEZs during the UNCLOS 
negotiations. As the dominant state, the US has dictated how, and to what extent, rising powers 
should be integrated in the US-led order, often insisting upon adherence to the settled rules and 
norms, with rising powers expected to assume responsibility for maintaining and defending – 
rather than changing – the order (Patrick 2016, 20). The fundamental American belief in the 
universality of US values and norms is viewed by some states, which are only partially 
embedded within, or external to, the American order, as inherently transformative and 
threatening. More importantly, for these states, the US-led order appears exclusive rather than 
inclusive. Consequently, a source of dissatisfaction and now contestation among re-emergent 
or rising powers is the so-called universally applicable character of the broader US-led rules-
based order (Ikenberry 2011, 189, Lind 2017, 78).  
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To ‘universalise’ the American rules and to get them settled, the Obama and Trump 
administrations aim to assert and defend Washington’s preferred notion of regional maritime 
order by securing freedom of navigation for military vessels. At the same time, they strive to 
marginalise the alternative position posited by some coastal states who seek to restrict the 
activities of naval powers in their EEZs. Yet the US position on defending UNCLOS as a 
foundation of regional maritime order is constrained by its own non-ratification of this 
Convention, although it adheres to the main principles of UNCLOS (Bateman 2006, 2). The 
following discussion focuses on the Obama administration’s strategic rebalance and the Trump 
administration’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy, which is the most recent 
strategy through which the US seeks to defend against the threat that China’s act vities present 
to the rules-based order and free and open access to the global commons in particular. 
 
From 2009 Washington openly demonstrated r gional leadership to counteract China’s 
excessive territorial and maritime claims against the Philippines and Vietnam and also to 
counter the harassment of US naval vessels (such as the USNS Impeccable in March 2009) 
across the South China Sea. As Clinton’s conversation with Dai Bingguo at the May 2010 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington attests, Beijing felt it was in a stronger 
position to reject American diktats on the shape or terms of China’s rise, especially with regard 
to its ‘core interests’ in the South China Sea (Clinton 2014, 75-76). The Obama 
administration’s announcement of the strategic rebalance in November 2011 signalled US 
intentions to remain at the heart of the regional order. The rebalance was a means to protect 
US trade and maritime interests and safeguard the American-led regional security order, 
especially in the maritime sphere. 
 
The Trump administration has been stark in setting out its twin objectives of deterring China’s 
contestation of the existing maritime order in the South China Sea, and creating a collaborative 
regional buttress to counter China’s order-building activities. Both the December 2017 
National Security Strategy (NSS) and the January 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) 
frame China as a revisionist state (along with Russia) and as a threat to the rules-based order. 
The 2017 NSS declares that ‘China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific 
region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its 
favor’ (White House 2017, 25). The 2018 NDS proclaims that the US is ‘facing increased 
global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-bas d international order’ 
(US Department of Defense 2018, 1). Both official documents emphasise the administration’s 
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assessment of China’s aims which are to dislodge the US and to upend the US-led rules-based 
order. By inferring that China has taken advantage of the inclusive (and universal) nature of 
the US order, the 2017 NSS rejects conventional US strategy that has sought to engage rivals 
(White House 2017, 3). Moreover, the adversarial nature of the 2017 NSS appears to preclude 
China’s attempts to rise peacefully with ‘Chinese characteristics’ in the existing order. 
  
The most recent strategic incarnation of US order-building and maintenance is the Trump 
administration’s FOIP strategy. The vision was initially outlined by President Trump at the 
November 2017 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Da Nang, Vietnam, with the 
details of the strategy being fleshed out seven months later by then-Secretary of Defense, James 
Mattis, at the June 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.17 Mattis confirmed an ongoing US 
commitment to the Indo-Pacific region, rooted in shared principles and values, the safeguarding 
of ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’ and the ‘protection of maritime orders and interests’ 
through improved interoperability with partners (Mattis 2018b).  
 
It is significant that the strategy was illuminated by the Pentagon and not the State Department, 
and at a regional security summit attended primarily by defence and security officials, to 
emphasise the security feel to the FOIP. The security element of the FOIP strategy, in addition 
to the economic and trade elements, is expected to act as an overarching security architecture 
containing the alliance system, the burgeoning mini-lateral groupings developing across the 
region (for example mini-lateral cooperation between Australia-Japan-India, US-Japan-South 
Korea, and the revived Quad [Australia, India, Japan and US]), in addition to other strategic 
partnerships (US-Singapore and US-Vietnam). Consistent with previous regional strategies, 
the aims are to protect US alliance system and liberal norms, and to strengthen US naval 
supremacy.  
 
By formally adopting the concept of ‘Indo-Pacific’, the US is catching up with other states in 
the region – including Japan, Australia, India and Indonesia – ll of whom have grasped the 
significance of the Indo-Pacific maritime space in the past decade.18 The US is advocating not 
only the expected safeguarding of maritime order in the Pacific Ocean but is also recognising 
                                                          
17 Japanese Prime Minister Abe first presented the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific at the sixth Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development, held in Kenya in August 2016 See: 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html (accessed 10 January 2019). 
18 While officially, ‘Asia-Pacific’ remained the preferred construct during the Obama Administration, Hillary 
Clinton first linked the Indian and Pacific Oceans in her “America’s Pacific Century” article (Clinton 2011).    
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the significant connectivity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, including the maritime 
spaces and coastal states within these two oceans, and acknowledging the role of India as a 
strategic partner to the US and as a crucial actor in the Indo-Pacific region (Pant 2018). 
 
Underwritten by the Obama administration’s strategic rebalance strategy and now incorporated 
into the FOIP strategy, the regional security order is expanding to include previously excluded 
states such as Vietnam, and to partially integrate non-aligned states, such as India (Ikenberry 
2011, 232), although not necessarily within the framework of a formal alliance – at least not 
initially. From Washington’s perspective, as emphasised by former Secretary of Defense 
Mattis, states who share principles that are aligned with and adhere to international law such 
as ‘respect for sovereignty and independence’ and who support ‘peaceful resolution of disputes 
without any coercion, free and fair trade and investment without practicing predatory 
economics against poorer countries trying to develop,’ are welcome (Mattis 2018a). Keen to 
promote a shared vision and shared principles with Southeast Asian nations, US Vice President 
Mike Pence also championed that the US stands ‘shoulder to shoulder with you [ASEAN 
members] for freedom of navigation…to ensure that your nations are secure in your sovereign 
borders on land [and] at sea’ when he attended the sixth US-ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 
November 2018 (Pence 2018).   
 
Pence also decisively asserted, ‘we all agree that empire and aggression have no place in the 
Indo-Pacific’ (emphasis added) (Pence 2018). This statement was aimed at countering China’s 
‘historical’ order-building, which justifies land reclamation activities, and hybrid salami-
slicing and grey zone operations (activities teetering between war and peace) in the South 
China Sea, using coast guard, fishing and paramilitary vessels to threaten and coerce local 
fishermen. More importantly, the goal of such tactics, as seen from Washington, is to gradually 
strengthen China’s presence and position in the South China Sea, and ultimately, to undermine 
the principle of freedom of the seas and specifically, to prevent the US Navy from operating 
freely in EEZ waters – ‘an application of the principle of freedom of the seas’ – as outlined in 
international law through UNCLOS (O'Rourke 2018, 3-4). As a naval power, for whom the 
right to operate freely in EEZ waters is essential, UNCLOS ‘does not give coastal states the 
right to regulate foreign military activities in the parts of their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-
mile territorial waters’; only the ability to regulate economic activities (O'Rourke 2018, 8).         
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As will be explored in the section below, FONOPs are integral to the protection and 
maintenance of the existing liberal maritime order but are also a source of tension between the 
US and China in relation to access to what China considers its EEZs around the contested 
islands in the South China Sea. Since 2010, the US has walked a fine line between maintaining 
neutrality over the sovereignty issue, and upholding international law; however, since 2014, 
priority has been given to protecting maritime public goods by conducting routine FONOPs in 
the South China Sea. The US position on Chinese island-building act vities and its ‘excessive’ 
claims based on historic rights are clear as they relate to UNCLOS: they contravene 
international maritime law. As its regional authority expands, China, however, refutes both 
aspects of the US maritime order and openly asserts a competing interpretation of key rules 
and norms, which is discussed below. 
 
 
Freedom of navigation: The front line of China-US order contestation  
In this section, we consider how China actively contests the US, through the exploitation of 
UNCLOS’s ambiguity over customary practice involving military activities in the EEZ and 
FON, and how the US asserts FON in response. China’s dissatisfaction with the status quo was, 
to a large extent, determined by its relatively low international status during the UNCLOS III 
negotiations; it was not party to the formation of UNCLOS I and II, as the PRC was not 
recognised as the sole legal government representing China by the UN until October 1971. 
China argues that the first four Conventions in 195819 did not reflect the interests of many 
developing states and only the interests of the naval superpowers, namely the US and the Soviet 
Union (Gao 2009, 267-270).   
 
US-China competing order-building activities in the South China Sea centre on their differing 
interpretations of customary practice and international law and principally relate to what FON 
activities can be ‘legally’ conducted by a third party in a coastal s te’s EEZ. Allowing a coastal 
state jurisdiction over the exploration and exploitation (and protection) of natural resources 
within the 200nm EEZ originated in the UNCLOS III negotiations. It was an attempt by coastal 
states to have greater access to their maritime resources to redress the balance, as international 
law had long been shaped by imperial conquerors or explorers (Hayton 2014, 120). As a 
                                                          
19 The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the High Seas, the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources 
of the High Seas. 
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compromise between mare liberum and mare clausum, freedom of navigation and overflight 
in the EEZ is, according to the US, recognised under UNCLOS to include military vessels and 
aircraft. Although this freedom is not explicitly affirmed, Article 58 appears to protect, or at 
least not prohibit, it (Tanaka 2015, 396).  
 
Having suffered from the trauma of Western invasion from the sea before 1949, China 
expresses a narrower interpretation of FON that precludes foreign naval vessels’ innocent 
passage through its territorial seas and FON through its EEZs. This interpretation is enshrined 
in its domestic law, notably its Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1992) and 
Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (1998).20 In its statement upon 
its ratification of UNCLOS in 1996, China reaffirmed its position on restricting innocent 
passage through its territorial sea.21 China’s objections concern FON and overflights in the 
EEZ, including definitions of the EEZ vis-à-vis the high seas (Articles 58, 78, 86 and 88 of 
UNCLOS), and interpretations of ‘peaceful purposes’ (Article 301), which relates to Chinese 
interpretation of any military activity as potentially falling within the ‘threat of force against a 
coastal state’ (Article 301) (Gao 2009, 293-294). Maintaining that the EEZ differs from the 
high seas in nature (by referring to Article 86), China takes issue with the legitimacy of US 
military activities within its self-defined South China Sea EEZs because of security concerns. 
The need to curtail or even cease freedom of navigation and overflight has become 
overwhelmingly important to Beijing since the installation of a naval base and a spacecraft 
launch site in Hainan, the southernmost province of China (You 2016, 649). Jurisdiction over 
the Paracel Islands (to the southeast of Hainan), including the adjacent waters, is now a matter 
of Chinese national security, requiring Beijing’s continued push for the legal status of an EEZ 
to approximate that of the territorial sea in international law. This is shown in the Impeccable 
incident of March 2009 in which China contended that it had the right to deny the USNS 
Impeccable’s entry into its EEZ off Hainan Island because UNCLOS grants Chinese 
jurisdiction over the EEZ (Ji 2009).22 Ideologically, China also alleges that freedom of 
                                                          
20 Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf; 
and http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/chn_1998_eez_act.pdf (accessed 
24 July 2018). For the first time China officially raised the notion of historic rights in Article 14 of the 1998 Law. 
21  China’s statement, dated 7 June 1996, is available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China%20Upon%20ratificati
on (accessed 27 February 2019). 
22 The Chinese line of argument is countered by the claim that the EEZ is sui generis and the coastal state’s 
jurisdiction is confined to the exploration and exploitation of living and non-living resources within the zone only. 
Jurisdiction is not equivalent to sovereignty (Dutton 2011, 49-50, Franckx 2011, 200, Tanaka 2015, 130). 
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navigation by warships was a Western colonial practice, facilitating European colonialisation 
of Asian states (Zhang 2010, 37). 
 
The US Department of Defense executes the FONOP program to globally enforce FON. The 
conduct of FONOPs, for the US, has both ‘legal and practical’ obligations so as to ensure that 
the hard-fought compromises on open maritime access to EEZs achieved during the arduous 
UNCLOS III negotiations continue to be upheld in ‘word and deed’ (Kuok 2016, iii). Aiming 
to challenge maritime claims which the US believes to be excessive, the FONOP programme 
was established in 1979, in the midst of the UNCLOS III negotiations, to protect US interests 
around the world in light of its stance on the insufficiency of international law to safeguard US 
navigational freedoms (Aceves 1996). Since UNCLOS neither explicitly sets out whether and 
what military activities can be conducted in the EEZ nor clarifies the relationship between the 
EEZ and the high seas, the US uses its FONOP programme to help ‘interpret’ UNCLOS 
through its own operational practices (Aceves 1996).23 It vows to uphold the basic principles 
governing the liberal order in the Asia-Pacific, namely ‘the peaceful resolution of disputes, the 
right of countries to make their own security and economic choices free from coercion, and the 
freedom of overflight and navigation guaranteed by international law’ (Carter 2016, 66). The 
conduct of FONOPs are also significant in light of China’s ‘strategic ambiguity’ over its as yet 
unspecified claims incorporated within its nine-dash line claims (either to the entire South 
China Sea or to the islands within it) (Kuok 2016, iii).  
 
The FONOP in October 2015 deserves particular attention for its direct challenge to the legality 
of Chinese activities in the Sea. USS Lassen sailed within 12 nm of Subi Reef, which was 
transformed into an artificial island by the Chinese in the Spratlys. The US argued that as an 
originally submerged reef, Subi was not qualified for having a 12nm territorial sea, according 
to UNCLOS (Green, Glaser and Poling 2015). While the US Navy and the Trump 
administration announced in June 2017 that it would no longer publicise the operations, the 
practice would continue (Clover 2017). In November 2018 US Vice President Pence assured 
his Southeast Asian audience in Singapore, ‘The South China Sea doesn’t belong to any one 
nation. And … the United States will continue to sail and fly wherever international law allows 
and our national interests are advanced’ (emphasis added) (White House 2018). President 
                                                          
23 Article 86 implies that high seas are ‘all parts of the sea which are not included in the EEZ, in the territorial sea 
or in the internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State’. The scope of the high 
seas therefore depends on whether a coastal state claims its EEZ (Tanaka 2015, 22- 3, 155). 
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Trump signed into law the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) of 2018 in December 2018 
which authorises the spending of $1.5 billion a year for five years (2019-2023) to enhance the 
US presence in the Indo-Pacific, including the enforcement of FON.24 The first FONOP after 
the signing of the ARIA was conducted by USS McCampbell in January 2019 when it transited 
under innocent passage within 12nm of the Paracels (Reuters 2019). In addition, the US is 
rallying international support and legitimacy for its FONOPs. Similar FON patrols were 
performed by other non-claimant states such as Australia, France, Japan and the UK in 2018 




At the beginning, we asked why both China and the US are equally determined to defend their 
respective ordering projects, even risking direct confrontation. At the heart of the South China 
Sea disputes, we argue, is not whether Chinese behaviour is assertive or aggressive, but is 
instead a contestation between Chinese and American order-building projects. This paper has 
unravelled China’s and US’s competing attempts to defend and promote their preferred 
maritime order in the South China Sea. China lays claim to sovereignty over the islands in the 
South China Sea by pursuing an irredentist approach that would revert the regional 
international order to the one accepted by the then major world powers, including China, at the 
Cairo and Potsdam conferences in 1943-1945 (before the Chinese Communists’ ascent to 
power). However, its historic notions of order have been undermined by, and are therefore 
currently incompatible with, the international ‘liberal’ order promoted by the US post-1951, 
which no longer recognises Chinese historic rights/titles to the islands (and/or the sea). 
Regional states have employed the legal framework presented by the post-war SFPT and 
UNCLOS to lay claims to the islands. The US, on the other hand, maintains that it is fiercely 
opposed to an increasingly assertive China that aims to unsettle the broadly accepted American-
led maritime order, built on international treaty and law nd the principle of freedom of 
navigation, enshrined in UNCLOS. 
 
                                                          
24 For the details of the ARIA of 2018, see: https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/s2736/BILLS-115s2736enr.pdf 
(accessed 23 February 2019). 
25 China was enraged at the British Defence Secretary Gary Williamson’s suggestion in February 2019 that a 
British aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth be deployed to the Pacific and the South China Sea in 2021 (Liu 
2019). 
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This order-contestation perspective helps understand why the disputes appear to have reached 
deadlock. International order is by its nature hierarchical. On the one hand, the US is unable to 
co-opt China into its order-building project; on the other, China fails to establish a negotiated 
and mutually agreeable order between itself, the US, regional states and ASEAN. Without 
committing itself to a set of contemporary international norms and rules, China can at best 
thwart the continuation of the American order without representing a more viable and 
legitimate regional order to ‘lock in’ other regional states. With limited scope of legitimacy, 
the two ordering projects presently co-exist uneasily within the South China Sea and in 
contention with each other. The disputes have thus reached an open-ended impasse. 
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